Political Economy

The Waning of the Bond Market Vigilantes

August 12th, 2011  |  Published in Political Economy, Politics

It wasn't so long ago that American politicians lived in fear of the bond market. During the Clinton administration, James Carville [famously said](http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/James_Carville) that "I used to think if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the pope or a .400 baseball hitter. But now I want to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody." That phenomenon gave rise to the concept of the "bond market vigilantes", which Krugman [loves to employ](http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/invisible-friends/).

But today, the bond market vigilantes are not much in evidence. Or rather, they are in evidence, but they suddenly seem unable to have much of an impact on U.S. fiscal policy. Bill Gross, of the ludicrously enormous bond fund PIMCO, is running around screaming about [the need for more borrowing](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/americas-debt-is-not-its-biggest-problem/2011/08/10/gIQAgYvE7I_story.html) and [more stimulus](http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/budget/167567-bond-giant-calls-for-new-us-stimulus). But he has no effect, because it turns out that while bond investors have powerful ways of constraining U.S. government borrowing, they have only indirect and weak means of expanding it.

The United States has a large debt that is routinely [rolled over](http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2011/07/inflating-away-debt), and it generally runs a budget deficit (Clinton interregnum aside). If bond investors start demanding higher interest rates on government debts, this immediately raises the cost of borrowing for the U.S. government. This, in turn, has knock-on effects throughout the economy, as interest rates rise for everyone and economic activity is thereby constrained. For these reasons, the U.S. government has powerful incentives to avoid doing things that cause the interest rate on treasuries to rise.

Today, however, we find ourselves in the opposite situation: what the bond market seems to want most of all is for the U.S. to borrow more money and stimulate the economy. That's the best explanation for the incredibly low yield on Treasury bonds, which is [negative in real terms](http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2011/08/treasury-real-interest-rates-now-negative-out-to-ten-years.html) over some time periods. And yet the U.S. is not borrowing more; instead both parties are demanding [insane policies](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/us/politics/08panel.html) that will cause a second recession, ostensibly based on fallacious notions about the magical effects of budget cutting and a [nonsensical conception](http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/barack-herbert-hoover-obama/) of the relationship between government and household finances.

The problem here is that the power of the bond market is asymmetrical. When the interest rate on Treasuries go up, this immediately makes all of the government's activities more expensive, and hence forces changes in fiscal planning. But when the interest rate falls to near zero, this only presents an *opportunity* for expanded borrowing, an opportunity that can easily be thrown away if the political system is too insane and dysfunctional to take advantage of it.

Hence the bond vigilantes sit on the sidelines, impotent and hopeless. Just like the rest of us.

On the Productivity of Unemployment

August 11th, 2011  |  Published in Political Economy, Work

There's a joke [going](http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2011/07/d-squared-argues-for-industrial-policy-of-a-sort.html) [around](http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/2011/08/11/293629/pay-for-jobs-programs-by-borrowing-money-at-low-rates/), due originally to [Daniel Davies](http://d-squareddigest.blogspot.com/2011/07/worlds-second-lowest-productivity.html)*, to the effect that unemployment is an extremely low productivity "industry", and that "There have been no major efficiency gains in unemployment in the last hundred years." All of the linked bloggers use this to make a case for an "industrial policy" of sorts, oriented toward moving people out of unemployment into some higher-productivity activity.

That's all well and good, but it made me think: maybe we should also be figuring out ways to increase the productivity of unemployment! That's a point that's sort of implicit in some of my [recent](http://www.peterfrase.com/2011/07/stop-digging-the-case-against-jobs/) [posts](http://www.peterfrase.com/2011/07/against-jobs-for-full-employment/), where I argue against the standard paradigm in which wage labor seems to be the [cause of, and solution to, all of life's problems](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUVwR0rw5fk). If you believe, as I do, that it's a good idea to reduce the amount of time people spend in paid employment, it would also be nice to increase the productivity of whatever they do in the time thus freed up.

And I would argue that we *have*, in fact, seen improvements in the productivity of unemployment--or at least, of *non*-employment. People without jobs can work in a community garden, or contribute to Wikipedia, or post funny videos on YouTube. Those may be small things, but they do improve our collective well-being--and two of them would have been impossible ten years ago.

Improving the productivity of non-employment is what I think Juliet Schor is on about in her recent book, [*Plenitude*](http://www.julietschor.org/2010/05/welcome-to-plenitude/):

> It’s based on an idea that’s novel to the sustainability discourse, but is has been around in standard economics since the 1960s: __when the returns from one activity fall, shift one’s energy and time into others.__ This is the theory of time allocation pioneered by Chicago economist Gary Becker. It’s also just plain common sense.

> In the year 2010 __this approach counsels shifting out of [Business As Usual] jobs, to local, small-scale activity that helps reduce dependence on the market system__ and lowers ecological footprint. Why is this attractive? One reason is that the BAU market has less to offer. It is failing to provide adequate jobs on a staggering scale. __An estimated 26 million Americans are either unemployed, under-employed or have gotten discouraged and stopped looking for work. That problem won’t go away even if the recovery continues.__ Incomes have fallen and government services are being cut. Wall Street and the wealthy have protected their outsized share of society’s production, but for the vast majority the prognosis is austerity.

There's some localist, "small is beautiful" stuff going on here that I don't particularly care for, but this is still a valiant attempt at crafting a new paradigm. And Schor does at least understand the importance of [replicators](http://www.julietschor.org/2010/08/new-work-centers-and-htsp/).

\* *By the way, Daniel Davies is the best blogger in the world. That's just a fact, you should read him if for some reason you don't already. [Who are the greatest bloggers of all time?](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z9lg6HqJeY0). Think about it. D-squared, d-squared, d-squared, d-squared and d-squared. Because he spits hot fire.*

The Dialectic of Peak Oil

August 10th, 2011  |  Published in Political Economy

Years ago, I had a brief infatuation the theory of [peak oil](http://peakoil.com/what-is-peak-oil/). This is the idea that we are now reaching, or will soon reach, a point at which the total amount of oil being produced in the world begins to decline due to a lack of new discoveries. Since the global economy is still highly dependent on oil to fuel economic growth, this is obviously a big problem.

People often talk about "running out" of oil, but that is not really the right way to think about it--the effects of diminishing reserves of easily accessible oil will be more complex than that. Hegel and Marx liked to talk about the dialectical relationship between "essence" and "form of appearance": the former is the more fundamental but not directly perceptible substance of things, while the latter is the concrete form in which those essences are reflected. Marx saw his work as an attempt to work from capitalism's form of appearance--wages, profits and rent, markets, business cycles, and so on--to its underlying essential forms, which turned out to be value and the process of capital accumulation.

With regard to oil, the essence of the situation is more or less as the peak oilers have it: less new oil reserves are being discovered, and what is discovered is much more difficult to extract. However, the form of appearance of this crisis will not necessarily be skyrocketing oil prices, as everyone seems to assume. Paradoxically, the aftermath of peak oil may turn out to be a period of *low* oil prices, accompanied by a prolonged global economic slump.

How is this possible? Well, think about the sequence of events that would unfold as the supply of oil declines. It's true that all things being equal, an additional barrel of oil should become more expensive. With most commodities, we would expect this to lead to people consuming less oil, leading to the price falling again. This is more or less the optimistic view of the situation: as oil becomes expensive, there will be an incentive to switch to other more sustainable energy sources, and everything will be OK in the long run.

However, oil is not a normal commodity--it is [highly inelastic](http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2011/04/raw-data-everyone-loves-oil), meaning that large changes in price have only a small effect on the demand for oil. This is because we are so dependent on oil, and there are still no good large-scale substitutes for it. It is, at the very least, uncertain whether we will actually be able to make a smooth transition to solar, wind, and other green sources of energy.

But if demand for oil is inelastic, then a rise in price will mean that everyone in the economy will have to spend more money on oil and oil-derived products, and less on anything else. This additional revenue will mostly be captured by oil companies and the governments of the big oil-producing countries, which will seek to reinvest their profits in the economy. But there will be a major shortfall in demand, precisely because the rest of the economy is being starved of demand because of high oil and gas prices.

This shortfall in aggregate demand, in turn, [leads to an economic slowdown](http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/12/worlds-oil-problem). If the economy slows down enough, and there are enough idled resources, then demand for oil will also fall--leading to a fall in energy prices. Indeed, there is evidence that this is [exactly what has happened](http://earlywarn.blogspot.com/2011/05/energy-prices-and-us-recessions.html) in our recent recessions. And now, with stock markets tanking and another recession looming, oil prices are [down again](http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/10/news/international/oil_economy/). Thus it turns out that the form of appearance of peak oil is low oil prices combined with a weak economy.

This dynamic is also relevant to ["Great Stagnation"](http://www.peterfrase.com/2011/07/cheap-labor-and-the-great-stagnation/)-style theories that explain weak economic growth as a function of slowing innovation. Tyler Cowen has an [interesting post](http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/08/is-there-a-productivity-crisis-in-canada.html) today in which he shows multifactor productivity in Canada, broken down by sector. It turns out that productivity is way up in the goods and manufacturing sector, but way down in mining, oil, and gas extraction. As Cowen notes, this "reflects Canada’s move from 'suck it up with a straw' oil to complex, high cost extraction tar sands projects and the like."

I don't think this dynamic is inevitable--we could, if we wanted to, invest a lot more money in de-carbonizing the economy and finding new energy sources. But that requires understanding the problem correctly, and unfortunately most people aren't very good at thinking dialectically. So if we are in for a prolonged period of slow economic growth, people will become susceptible to all kinds of [false explanations](http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/the-white-house-believes-in-the-confidence-fairy/), and will be reluctant to consider the possibility that a resource constraint lies beneath the phenomenon of economic weakness.

###Postscript

This argument isn't really original to me. I picked it up from Mark Jones, who was an early Internet Marxist, a founding editor of the journal *Capital and Class*, and an all around strange and beguiling intellectual figure. He died a number of years ago, and it's sadly quite difficult to track down his various online writings these days. But here's [a post](http://www.feralscholar.org/blog/index.php/2005/05/14/oh-what-the-heck-heres-mark-jones/) that lays out a somewhat more hyperbolic version of the same theory I've just described:

> This is first of all and above all, an accumulation crisis, not a resource crisis. The oil will never run out, and most of even known, easily-accessible conventional oil reserves will probably stay underground forever and never be pumped. As for non-conventional resources like tar-sands--let alone hydrogen--they will remain mere fantasy. In the wake of a severe slow-down, neither capital--nor, crucially, effective demand--will exist capable of bringing the alternatives onstream. World capitalism can slip into a post-crash equilibrium state which can endure for decades or longer, amid unprecedented social stress and immiseration. To say this is not (obviously) to seek it or to welcome it; but only by resolutely analysing historical processes, and not by hiding from them, can we hope to positively influence outcomes.

Redistribution Under Neoliberalism

August 8th, 2011  |  Published in Data, Political Economy, Politics, Social Science, Statistical Graphics, xkcd.com/386

Last week, Seth Ackerman wrote a *Jacobin* [blog post](http://jacobinmag.com/blog/?p=891) in which he gave us a snarky attack on the record of "left neo-liberalism" in the United Kingdom. Basically, he showed that while New Labour managed to reduce poverty somewhat with cash transfer programs, the progress was meager and could not be sustained. Since the programs were financed out of a series of asset bubbles, the UK has seen poverty go back up again with the recent crisis.

I don't have much quarrel with this account, but I'm not sure it can bear the weight of the argument that Seth wants to put on it. He suggests that the UK experience is a refutation of the general strategy of progressive neoliberalism, which Freddie DeBoer felicitously dubbed ["globalize-grow-give"](http://lhote.blogspot.com/2011/01/globalize-grow-give-progressivism-and.html):

> First, you embrace the standard globalization model of reduced or eliminated tariff walls, large free trade agreements such as NAFTA or CAFTA, deregulation, and general trade liberalization. This encourages international trade and the exporting of jobs from highly-regulated, fairly well compensated, high worker standard of living places like the United States to the cheap labor, low regulation, low worker standard of living places like China or Indonesia. This spurs international economic growth in both the exporting and importing countries. Here at home, higher growth results in higher tax revenues which can then be redistributed from those at the top of the income distribution (who have benefited from the globalized trade regime) to those at the bottom of the income distribution (who have been hurt by the globalized trade regime that undercuts their wages and exports their jobs).

I think that if you want to really criticize this view, you need to look beyond the UK, which is neither a very generous nor a particularly well-designed welfare state. As it happens, my day job involves analyzing cross-national income data, so I'm going to perpetrate some social science on y'all.

The way I read the "globalize-grow-give" critique, you can extract an empirical claim about how the income distribution should look in a G-G-G economy. The distribution of income *before* taxes and transfers will become increasingly unequal due to deregulation and globalization, but the distribution *after* taxes and transfers are accounted for will not become vastly more unequal because government is compensating for the inequality in the private market.

To test this, I did some simple calculations, following other researchers who have done [similar](http://www.lisproject.org/publications/liswps/392.pdf) [things](http://www.lisproject.org/publications/liswps/458.pdf). Using data from the [Luxembourg Income Study](http://www.lisdatacenter.org/), I calculated the [Gini coefficient](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient), a standard measure of inequality, for several different countries. I calculated two different Ginis:

- The Gini of *market income*. Market income is defined here as income from wages, pensions, self-employment and property. This is income *before* any taxes or transfers are accounted for.
- The Gini of *disposable income*. This is the income that people actually have to spend, after taxes are deducted and any transfers are added in. (For more details about the variables, see the postscript).

Unfortunately, the difficulty of harmonizing cross-national data means that the numbers I have access to are a bit out of date--specifically, they end before the current crisis period. I still think we can learn something useful from them, however. The way G-G-G neoliberalism is supposed to work, the Gini of market income should go up but the Gini of disposable income should not--or at least should rise more slowly. We can think of the difference between market income inequality and disposable income inequality as a rough measure of the amount of redistribution done by the state.

So here's what things look like in the UK:

Income Inequality in the UK

This figure basically supports Seth's argument. Market income inequality has gone way up in the last few decades, but disposable income inequality has gone up by a lot as well. The state is doing a bit more redistribution than it used to, but not enough to make up for the rise in private-market inequality. If you look at the United States, the situation is even worse, as the state has done essentially nothing to counter rising inequality in market income:

Income Inequality in the USA

The question, though, is whether it has to be like this. Let's put the UK alongside another rich European economy, Germany:

Income Inequality in the UK and Germany

Here we see something very interesting. Before you take taxes and transfers into account, the rise in inequality in Germany looks very similar to what happened in the UK--indeed, the two countries converge to almost the same value by 2005. But disposable income inequality has stayed flat in Germany, because the German state has used taxes and transfers to counteract rising inequality.

Every good social democrat loves the Nordic model, so let's finish off with a look at Sweden:

Income Inequality in Sweden

Here the story is a bit different--both market income and disposable income inequality have remained pretty flat, although both have risen a bit. The important thing to note here is that even in the most socialist of welfare states, market income inequality is very high, nearly as high as it is in the UK or US. The fact that Sweden is one of the least unequal countries on earth has to do almost entirely with taxes and transfers.

So what can we conclude from all this? Let me be clear that I don't think this is a knock-down argument in favor of "globalize-grow-give" as a political model. But I think the best argument against the G-G-G model is not that it's economically impossible or dependent on asset bubbles. Rather, I'd point us back to the political arguments enumerated by [me](http://www.peterfrase.com/2011/07/policy-politics-and-strategy/), [Henry Farrell](http://crookedtimber.org/2011/07/25/neo-liberalism-the-submerged-state-and-the-politics-of-nudge/), and [Cosma Shalizi](http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/weblog/778.html) among others. What makes Sweden and Germany different is not that their economies are different from those in the US and UK (although they are), but that they have different political environments, featuring things like a hegemonic Social Democratic party in Sweden and a strong labor movement in Germany.

So if left-neoliberalism is to be a workable political agenda rather than the motto of useful idiots for the "globalize-grow-keep" agenda of the right-wing neoliberals, it has to either make its peace with the sources of working-class power that currently exist, or else come up with workable models of what might replace them.

*[Postscript for income inequality nerds only: the income variables are equivalized for household size using the square root of the number of persons in the household as the equivalence scale. The variables are then topcoded at ten times the equivalized mean and bottom-coded at 1 percent of the equivalized mean.*

*Note that the transfers included in disposable income are only cash transfers and "near-cash" benefits (like food stamps), not in-kind services like health care. So you could argue that this data actually understates the extent of redistribution.*

*If you'd like to look at the data, including a bunch of countries I didn't include in the post, it's [here](http://www.peterfrase.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/mi_dpi_gini1.csv). For help interpreting the country codes, go [here](http://www.lisdatacenter.org/our-data/lis-database/documentation/list-of-datasets/)]*

The Decay of the Capitalist Class

August 2nd, 2011  |  Published in Political Economy

A recent [post](http://www.angrybearblog.com/2011/07/investment-consumption-and-progressive.html) from Bruce Webb at Angry Bear gave me a new angle on the fecklessness of our ruling elites, who currently seem incapable of even running capitalism for their own benefit. The basic insight here is that capitalism requires the capitalist class to impose an austere kind of discipline not just on the working class, but on *itself*. And while the breakdown of worker discipline causes well-known problems for capitalism, the decay of capitalist discipline poses difficulties as well.

Doug Henwood has long [observed](http://www.leftbusinessobserver.com/RottingHead.html) (and long threatened to write a book about) the [decay and decomposition](http://www.brooklynrail.org/2009/07/express/ka-pow-bang-crash-down-goes-another-bubble) of the American ruling class. Rather than a disciplined force that seeks to promote the long-run accumulation of capital, our elite increasingly appears short-sighted and avaricious--more interested in looting the system through bailouts and high-end tax cuts than in ensuring the its long term health. Henwood:

> Well, you know it was once the WASP elite, but there ain't none of that now. I think __one of the problems of the United States is that there is a great deal of incoherence at the upper level__, that unlike the WASP ruling class, __there is no social formation that can think in the truly long-term, that can think beyond the short-term concerns__ about the accumulation of money, the most amount of money in the quickest possible time.

Webb's [post](http://www.angrybearblog.com/2011/07/investment-consumption-and-progressive.html) is about something slightly different, but related: is the capitalist class primarily oriented towards accumulation, or towards "consumption and display"?

> __Classical, neo-classical, and neo-liberal economics__ all share a common mistaken psychological premise, one that is simple but deep, and in itself explains why they don't understand the aims of Progressive Taxation.

> Label it how you like, the academic discipline that emerged from England in the 18th and 19th century implicitly, hell I'll make it stronger, __explicitly assumed that the goal of capitalism is accumulation, i.e. getting more an more numbers on the right side of the ledger sheet.__ Which assumption seems blindingly obvious, which is why it is simple and goes so deep. In this model taxation on gains from capital serve to displace investment on the equally simple assumption that if you tax something people do less of it. Again perhaps blazingly obvious.

> But __it doesn't hold up well against the historical record either narrowly considered in relation to 18th and 19th century England or more broadly across cultures and across history. Instead in most of those cultures and most definitely in Georgian and then Victorian England the evidence is strong that capitalists saw investment as the means to different ends, those of consumption and display that in turn would lead to societal status.__ You only have to look at the great Country Houses that were built during this period, with no expenses spared inside or out whether that be on landscape architects or silversmiths.

With respect to my favorite classical (or post-classical) economist, this is only partially in keeping with what Marx thought. True, he believed that capitalists had to accumulate; but he also [thought](http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch24.htm#S3) that the capitalist "developed in his breast, a Faustian conflict between the passion for accumulation, and the desire for enjoyment." And he might agree with Webb about what was going on in the 19th Century, but he would see it as a sign of capitalism's ill health. As he [put it in *Capital*](http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch24.htm#S3):

> Even __in the early part of the 18th century, a Manchester manufacturer, who placed a pint of foreign wine before his guests, exposed himself to the remarks and headshakings of all his neighbours.__ Before the rise of machinery, a manufacturer's evening expenditure at the public house where they all met, never exceeded sixpence for a glass of punch, and a penny for a screw of tobacco. It was not till 1758, and this marks an epoch, that a person actually engaged in business was seen with an equipage of his own.

> > "The fourth period," __the last 30 years of the 18th century, "is that in which expense and luxury have made great progress__, and was supported by a trade extended by means of riders and factors through every part of Europe."

> What would the good Dr. Aikin say if he could rise from his grave and see the Manchester of today?

> __Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!__ "Industry furnishes the material which saving accumulates." [23] Therefore, __save, save, i.e., reconvert the greatest possible portion of surplus-value, or surplus-product into capital! Accumulation for accumulation's sake, production for production's sake__: by this formula classical economy expressed the historical mission of the bourgeoisie, and did not for a single instant deceive itself over the birth-throes of wealth. [24] But what avails lamentation in the face of historical necessity? __If to classical economy, the proletarian is but a machine for the production of surplus-value; on the other hand, the capitalist is in its eyes only a machine for the conversion of this surplus-value into additional capital.__

The point Marx is making here is that capitalism doesn't just trap workers within the prison of alienated and exploitative labor, it also subjects capitalists to the endless treadmill of accumulation for the sake of accumulation. (On this point, see also my [earlier](http://www.peterfrase.com/2011/03/capitalism-without-capitalists/) [remarks](http://www.peterfrase.com/2011/07/reanimated-marxism/) on the distinction between *capital* and *capitalists*). This point doesn't often get made, I think, because it's contrary to most Marxists' moral orientation--nobody feels all that bad for the capitalist, and it's still [good to be the king](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lZKiYgcgBAY). Nevertheless, to be a good capitalist takes discipline--so what happens when the dominant image of the capitalist is no longer Ebenezer Scrooge, but [Steve Schwarzman's birthday party](http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/02/11/080211fa_fact_stewart)? Says Webb:

> So what does this have to do with progressive taxation? Well once you accept the assumption that the fundamental goal of investment among the upper classes is consumption and display and further that in most cases that consumption doesn't have the multiplicative effects on the wider economy that re-investment would then the goal of progressive taxation becomes obvious, and by the way a lot less socialist than the old shibboleth of redistribution. __The goal of progressive taxation in the classical political liberal position dominate in this country from 1913-1980 was to penalize consumption and favor re-investment. After all at least under current law gains on capital are by and large not exposed to federal taxation until they are realized, if instead they are plowed back into productivity improvements they are at the corporate or individual level largely tax exempt. It is only when you take the equity out in the form of interest, dividends or simply cashing out equity that tax is encured.__

> The logical conclusion of this model is that if we accept the principle that to tax something is to induce people to do it less, if nothing else by increasing its marginal cost, then Supply Side becomes the Voodoo the Elder Bush always said it was. __Lowering top marginal rates and taxing capital gains at half the rates of capital income would under my model have the effect of encouraging consumption and discouraging reinvestment. Whereas high rates would have the opposite effect.__ Which has the advantage of being testable, if we had to constrast the 50s and the 80s in terms of the consumption patterns of the near the top level of capitalists and managers we see a lot less conspicuous consumption among the former than we do in the post Reagan-era. In the 50s and 60s only Greek shipping magnates could afford the kind of consumption patterns that became common in before, during, and after the Enron era and certainly continuing today. From my perspective __all Supply Side did was to lower the cost of consumption in pre-tax dollars, purchases that were inconceivable in the days of 90 and then 70% top rates have become routine in the days of 15%.__

So if the capitalist class was truly able to act as a collective personification of capital, then they would be for progressive taxation! But to bring this back to Henwood's argument, we see instead that the ruling class is too fractious and selfish to impose this kind of discipline on themselves. Instead, they're just trying to make off with as much loot as they can, and live as lavishly as possible. The result is a [plutonomy](http://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i_cite/2009/10/plutonomy.html) in which "There are rich consumers, few in number, but disproportionate in the gigantic slice of income and consumption they take.".

The only counterpoint to this that I can see is that at the very top, the accumulation of money itself is, in Webb's terms, the "display" that "leads to social status". Making money becomes like points in a game, as everyone tries to get the biggest [pool of money](http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/355/the-giant-pool-of-money). Why else, after all, would a billionaire hedge fund owner keep trying to grow ever richer, even after accumulating more riches than they or their family could ever consume? Unfortunately, these hoards of money seem mostly to be put to use chasing asset bubbles, high-frequency trading, and other sorts of zero-sum competition rather than investing in productive activity.

Cheap Labor and the Great Stagnation

July 27th, 2011  |  Published in Political Economy, Work

The National Employment Law Project has a [new report out](http://www.nelp.org/goodjobsdeficit) Called "The Good Jobs Deficit", in which they note that the terrible job market is even worse than people realize. Not only are few jobs being created, but those that are being created are predominantly low-wage jobs, worse than the ones they are replacing. Thus the wages of American workers are stagnant or even falling in some cases.

This isn't really surprising, as we've known about the problem of [low-wage job growth](http://www.urbanresearch.org/projects/low-wage-work-metropolitan-america) for a while. But the report made me think about something else: Tyler Cowen's recent book, [*The Great Stagnation*](http://www.amazon.com/Great-Stagnation-Low-Hanging-Eventually-ebook/dp/B004H0M8QS). In that book, Cowen took note of the stagnation of incomes for the broad majority, but he interpreted it as a symptom of a deeper problem:

> Median income is the single best measure of how much we are producing new ideas that benefit most of the American population. Yet the picture is depressing . . . You can see the rate of growth of per capita median income slows down around 1973, which I take as the end of the era of low-hanging fruit. As an approximation, if median income had continued to grow at its earlier postwar rate, the median family income today would be over $90,000.

Cowen goes on to say that "The American left has pointed out and indeed stressed measures of stagnant median income, but it usually blames politics, insufficient redistribution, or poor educational opportunities rather than considering the idea of a technological plateau." So for Cowen, the causal story is that technological stagnation leads to stagnating income. He treats the innovation slowdown as basically exogenous, the result of a lack of "low hanging fruit", easily discovered and exploited technologies that can increase our standard of living. So at the end of the book, Cowen's recommendation is essentially that we should try to make science a higher-prestige occupation, and then just wait around and accept stagnation until somebody finds some more low-hanging fruit.

But I think Cowen gives insufficient attention to the reverse causal story: one cause of technological stagnation is that labor is too cheap. As Daron Acemoglu [explains](http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/14809.html) in this paper, you can use the tools of mainstream economics to construct a model in which the development of labor-saving technology is more rapid when there is scarcity of labor. Economic historians [have suggested](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habakkuk_thesis) that one of the reasons that technological progress in the 19th century was faster in the United States than in Britain was that labor was scarce in the U.S.

The reasoning here is pretty straightforward. A rational manager will only adopt labor-saving technology if it is cheaper than the labor it replaces. And when labor is scarce, wages rise as employers compete against each other for workers, making it more attractive to save on labor by using machines instead. For instance, suppose a [self checkout](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self_checkout) machine for a grocery store ends up costing $10 per hour over its lifetime, when you account for purchase and maintenance costs. If your cashiers make $8 per hour, there's no reason to use the machines. But if they make $12, you have an incentive to replace cashiers with machines, and manufacturers have more incentive to come up with this kind of labor saving technology.

This isn't great for the cashiers who lose their jobs, obviously. But in the larger scheme of things, working at a supermarket checkout isn't the kind of fulfilling and valuable work we really want to preserve, and this kind of technological change is necessary if we want to improve our overall standard of living and move in the direction of a [post-scarcity society](http://www.peterfrase.com/2010/12/anti-star-trek-a-theory-of-posterity/). That's one of the reasons I argued that preserving and creating jobs [shouldn't be the left's main preoccupation](http://www.peterfrase.com/2011/07/stop-digging-the-case-against-jobs/). Instead, we need to ease the pain of unemployment for those who are displaced.

But in addition, we need to raise wages. So how do we make labor more expensive? One way is to raise the minimum wage and increase rates of unionization, which are both good ideas. And rising wages [in China](http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_13/b3977049.htm) will hopefully start to improve the situation on a global scale. But in the United States, the most important thing is to get back to full employment--i.e., create labor scarcity throughout the labor market. Just keep in mind that we don't necessarily need to do it by [creating a ton of jobs](http://www.peterfrase.com/2011/07/against-jobs-for-full-employment/).

Against Jobs, For Full Employment

July 26th, 2011  |  Published in Political Economy, Politics, Time, Work

Mike Konczal [said something](https://twitter.com/#!/rortybomb/status/95569439671590913) on Twitter that pointed out the odd resonance between [this Will Wilkinson post](http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/07/unemployment-and-jobs) at the *Economist* and the rant against obsessing over "job creation" that I wote for [*The Activist*](http://theactivist.org/blog/stop-digging-the-case-against-jobs). Actually, I originally wrote it for the newsletter of the political organization that I'm a member of, the [Democratic Socialists of America](http://dsausa.org/dsa.html), and my argument was directed at my fellow leftists who I think sometimes lose sight of our historic criticisms of wage labor as a source of alienation and domination.

Wilkinson, by contrast, is kind of a softcore libertarian. And yet here he is echoing a longstanding commonplace of Marxism:

> David Ellerman, one of my favourite challenging thinkers, argues that the employer-employee relationship is more like the master-slave relationship than we are inclined to believe. I know this sounds a little crazy, and I don't entirely buy his argument. But take a look; he's on to something. Philosophical questions of self-ownership and the alienability of labour aside, I am convinced that autonomy is profoundly important to most of us, and that the sort of self-rental involved in the employment relation is regularly experienced as a lamentable loss of autonomy, if not humiliating subjection. I think a lot of us would rather not work for somebody else.

This is not really very different from Marx's account of alienated labor in capitalism. (It is, incidentally, especially hilarious to see this is published by the *Economist*. It has existed since Marx's day, and you can actually find passages in Marx's work where he trashes the *Economist* for basically the same reasons people trash it today.) I was making basically the same point in my essay:

> Most of the unemployed don't actually want jobs -- that is, they don't just want a place to show up every day and be told what to do. The real problem these people have is not that they need jobs, but that they need money. We've just been trained to think that the only way to solve this problem is to get people jobs.

In other words, wage labor sucks, and a lot of people will only do it if the alternative is destitution.

Of course, Wilkinson's argument differs from mine in important ways. In particular, he conceives of the alternative to wage labor in terms of other kinds of monetized interactions, like "cutting hair for money in a kitchen, or legally making a few bucks every now and then taxiing people around town in a 1988 Ford Escort", whereas I focused more on socially beneficial activities that are outside the money economy altogether, like taking care of children and writing open source software, and on the inherent benefits of simply increasing everyone's free time. Hence his policy recommendations, while overlapping with mine somewhat, are focused on deregulation and opening up the informal economy.

I'm not necessarily against deregulating the labor market. But deregulation would have to be paired with a far more robust social democratic safety net in order to ensure that a life outside the control of the boss is possible for everybody, and not just for a small labor aristocracy of people like Will Wilkinson (and me). That's why my essay talked about national health care, more generous unemployment, efforts to reduce the work week, and ultimately some kind of guaranteed income that allows people to survive outside of the labor market. (As for where the money for this should come from, please see [John Quiggin](http://crookedtimber.org/2011/07/25/where-the-money-is/).) Those are the things that make exiting the labor market a real option for the non-rich. And just as importantly, they reduce the risk and uncertainty that's associated with not having regular, full time employment. As it stands, the downside risk of losing your job is much greater if you're less educated, less healthy, or have more dependents than Wilkinson does.

I view all of this as an alternative strategy for getting back to full employment that doesn't rely entirely on job-creation programs. I want to clarify this point, because it wasn't made well in my original essay, which was constructed to be as brief and inflammatory as I could make it in order to attract as much attention to the argument as possible. I've noticed that some people conflated my rant against *jobs* with an opposition to *full employment*.

So I should make clear that I'm not opposed to full employment; in fact, I think that achieving and maintaining full employment is of paramount importance if we want to give people the real option of cutting back hours or quitting their jobs. For example, we know that there are lots of people who [wish they could work fewer hours](http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/social_forces/v081/81.4reynolds.html), but whose employers won't let them. And studies like these probably understate the desire for fewer hours because they don't do a very good job of distinguishing the desire for work from the desire for money. But whatever people would *like* to do, they don't have much leverage to negotiate or to find new jobs if they face a millions-strong reserve army of the unemployed. In a high-unemployment environment like the current one, we see people who have jobs [being worked harder](http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/06/speed-up-american-workers-long-hours), but quitting at [historically low rates](http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/23/news/economy/trapped_in_a_job/index.htm).

However, the demand for full employment is distinct from the demand for jobs in ways that are politically salient. It is important to bear in mind that "full employment" is not just another way of saying "lots of jobs". It is a piece of economic jargon, a technical term for the situation in the labor market when employers' demand for labor meets or exceeds the supply of people looking for jobs across all the broad categories of employment. Keeping the economy in this state is highly desirable for working people and for leftist politics, for reasons best explained in the 1940's by the Polish economist Michal Kalecki, in his important essay on ["Political Aspects of Full Employment"](http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/kalecki220510.html):

> [U]nder a regime of permanent full employment, the 'sack' would cease to play its role as a 'disciplinary measure. The social position of the boss would be undermined, and the self-assurance and class-consciousness of the working class would grow. Strikes for wage increases and improvements in conditions of work would create political tension. It is true that profits would be higher under a regime of full employment than they are on the average under laissez-faire, and even the rise in wage rates resulting from the stronger bargaining power of the workers is less likely to reduce profits than to increase prices, and thus adversely affects only the rentier interests. But 'discipline in the factories' and 'political stability' are more appreciated than profits by business leaders.

Demands for government-led job creation target full employment by increasing demand for labor in the hopes that this will both soak up surplus labor directly and spur increased private sector demand for labor through the multiplier effect of public investment. However, there is no *a priori* reason why creating more demand for wage labor should be the only or the primary mechanism of reaching full employment. To the extent that job sharing schemes reduce unemployment by distributing work across more workers, the economy can approach full employment without creating new work in the aggregate. Just as importantly, since the definition of full employment depends on both the supply of and the demand for labor, full employment can be reached by reducing the supply of labor rather than increasing demand.

Why would we want to reduce labor supply? One reason, which I emphasized in "Stop Digging", is that wage labor is a form of domination that lots of people find inherently unpleasant, and that a lot of what people do for wages is less socially desirable than what they could do if they had control over their own time. But another good reason is that certain political priorities that the left supports for other reasons have the effect of decreasing labor supply. Hence a focus on the labor supply side can help us to ensure that the quest for full employment is not at cross purposes with our other goals.

Take, for example, health care reform. It is [generally accepted](http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2011/01/theres_no_job-killing_health-c.html) that there are a certain number of people who would like to retire or otherwise leave the labor force, but who stay in their jobs because that is the only way they can maintain access to health insurance. A program of national health care that successfully guaranteed universal coverage and severed health care from employment would cause these people to drop out of the labor force; all things being equal, this would move the economy toward full employment as these jobs were filled by the unemployed and the total pool of people seeking work shrank. However, this move toward full employment involves no net job creation since it is entirely targeted to the labor supply side.

More generally, any reform that makes it easier to survive outside of employment may have the effect of reducing labor supply, if you believe--as I do and Will Wilkinson does--that lots of people would prefer not to work for wages if they can avoid it. Health care, government-funded child care, social security, welfare, and disability benefits are all steps toward what sociologists of the welfare state [refer to as the "de-commodification"](http://www.peterfrase.com/2011/06/de-commodification-in-everyday-life/) of labor power. To the extent that people can get by without working for wages, they are able to avoid commodifying themselves and selling their labor.

Even at the height of an economic expansion, large numbers of people are not participating in wage labor. Among Americans aged 16 and older, about a third are neither working nor looking for work--and this was true even before the recession. Some of these people are so-called "discouraged workers" who want a job but have given up looking for one, but many others are retired, or are in school, or unable to work due to disability, or are taking care of children and elders, or are voluntarily out of employment for some other reason. There are ways that public policy could be used to force many of these people into the labor force. But doing so is in general a *right-wing* policy goal: for the same reason that full employment is politically good for workers, it is bad for capitalists, and the political agents of capital understand that one way of avoiding full employment while maximizing profits is to keep the supply of labor as high as possible. Which is why Republicans are currently obsessed with [increasing labor supply](http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/2011/07/26/279048/the-bigger-the-government-the-taller-the-people/) while doing nothing to increase the demand for labor.

"Against jobs, for full employment" seems at first like a paradoxical demand, but I hope I've shown that it isn't. By opposing the narrow rhetoric of job creation, I didn't intend to diminish the importance of tackling the crisis of the unemployed head-on; I merely wanted to suggest that there are alternative avenues for addressing this crisis that are both more humane and more radical.

Reanimated Marxism

July 17th, 2011  |  Published in Political Economy, Politics, Socialism

In the new *Jacobin*, Mike Beggs has a [great article about Marxism]( http://jacobinmag.com/summer-2011/zombie-marx/) in which he lays out an approach to Marx's thought that very much resonates with my own conception of Marxism:

> If we are to engage in these ways with modern economics, what, if anything, makes our analysis distinctively Marxist? It is the two-fold project behind Capital as a critique of political economy: first to demonstrate the social preconditions that lie beneath the concepts of political economy, and especially their dependence on class relationships; and second, to demonstrate these social relations as historical, not eternal.

> These two strands of Marx’s thought are as valid as ever. The way to apply them today is not to maintain the form and content of Capital as a complete, separate way to approach economics, as if we are superior because we begin from superior principles. Instead, I think it is to approach modern economics as we find it and ask the same kinds of critical questions: what are the social conditions that make economic phenomena appear the way they do? It is to deal not only, not even mainly, with economic high theory, but also with the applied economics produced every day in the reports and statements of central banks, Treasuries, the IMF, etc., and ask, what are the implicit class relations here? Why are these the driving issues at this point in history? What are the deeper social contradictions lying behind them? The pursuit of a separate system of economics as something wholly other from mainstream economics isolates us from the political and ideological space where these things take place: better, instead, to fight from the inside, to make clear the social and political content of the categories.

Beggs also posted a fascinating [letter from Joan Robinson](http://jacobinmag.com/blog/?p=632) on the topic of non-orthodox Marxism, prompting a post from [Kieran Healy](http://crookedtimber.org/2011/07/17/what-i-mean-is-that-i-have-marx-in-my-bones-and-you-have-him-in-your-mouth/).

Contrast this with the recent series of posts at Crooked Timber, where John Quiggin wrote on "Marxism Without Revolution". There he poses the question: "what becomes of Marxism if you abandon belief in the likelihood or desirability of revolution?" Quiggin's own politics are a form of Keynesian Social Democracy, which he sets in contrast with what he sees as the inadequacy or obsolescence of the revolutionary Marxist tradition.

But Marxism is only obsolete if you approach it in the spirit of what Beggs calls the "zombie Marxists". Like Quiggin, my day-to-day politics are in many ways social democratic--I am concerned with elections, welfare state policy, and the like. Unlike Quiggin, I consider myself a Marxist, primarily because I do still believe in "revolution" in the sense of a transition to a post-capitalist society, though not necessarily in the sense of an insurrectionary seizure of state power by a revolutionary movement.

However, Quiggin raises a number of important points about what is or isn't still relevant in Marxism, so I found it useful to work out in some detail where I do and don't agree with his takes on three major aspects of Marxism: class, crisis, and capital.

### Class

In the [first post](http://crookedtimber.org/2011/06/19/marxism-without-revolution-class/), Quiggin says that:

> The analysis of economics and history in terms of class struggle is the central distinguishing feature of Marxism, and remains essential to any proper understanding. That said, the specifically Marxist class analysis in which the industrial working class, brought together in large factories, and increasingly homogenized and immiserised, serves as the inevitable agent of revolution, clearly hasn't worked and isn't going to.

I don't quite agree with the first sentence: class struggle was obviously a preoccupation of Marx, but I don't think that the explanation of history as the product of class struggles is necessarily the most important part of the theory, or the one most relevant to the present day. I will return to that point below.

I do, however, agree with the second point. In Marxist thought, two meanings of "the working class" are often conflated. At a high level of abstraction, the working class is all those who make their living by working for others rather than by owning the means of production and hiring employees to operate them. In this sense almost all of us are working class; yet as Quiggin observes, the working class in this sense is too heterogeneous and diffuse to form a self-aware "class for itself". Thus Marxists have also long spoken of a working class defined in more narrow sociological terms as given here by Quiggin.

And I agree with Quiggin that the industrial, factory-based working class is unlikely to serve as the collective agent of revolution due to its declining centrality in capitalist economies. Indeed, this very problem is at the heart of my new essay in *Jacobin* (not currently online), in which I reach back to a theory of non-class based collective identity (Benedict Anderson's theory of nationalism) in order to extract some ideas about where the collective revolutionary agent may come from in 21st Century America.

So what use is Marxism, without its central collective actor? We can extract the aspect of Marxist class analysis that is still useful, if we think more carefully about the paradoxical position that the working class occupies in Marx's thought. On the one hand, the working class in the narrow factory-industrial sense was supposed to be the group that led and carried out the revolution against capitalism. But on the other hand, the working class in the most general sense--as wage labor--is also the thing that is supposed to be *abolished* by the revolution. The notion of a class that simultaneously realizes and abolishes itself is a clever historical irony, but it is perhaps easier to imagine that the task of abolishing wage labor would be carried out by people who, while they are wage laborers, do not *identify* themselves or their movement as "working class" first and foremost. Certainly it's tempting to think so today, when identification with the idea of being someone who "works" is so often bound up with [a reactionary politics](http://jacobinmag.com/winter-2011/hipsters-food-stamps-and-the-politics-of-resentment/) of producerist *ressentiment*.

The above, then, is my response to the way Quiggin ends his post. He notes that while the traditional working class may be disappearing, it is still quite coherent to speak of a "ruling class", the top 1 percent of society. But if there is a coherent ruling class and only an inchoate exploited class, then Marxism risks ending up in a defeatist dead end. What I am trying to suggest, however, is that such defeatism is not inevitable. What is necessary instead is a recognition that while the oppressiveness of wage labor as a system of domination has not disappeared, we no longer know what the political vehicle for overturning that domination will be. The answer is not to give up, but to think harder about different models of collective identity and movement formation.

### Crisis

Quiggin [breaks Marx's theory of crisis into two parts](http://crookedtimber.org/2011/06/25/marxism-without-revolution-crisis/) . The first is "the idea that crisis is a normal part of capitalism rather than an aberration resulting from exogenous shocks." The second is "crises would grow steadily more intense, driven by the declining rate of profit, until they brought about the revolutionary overthrow of the system."

The first component is, I agree, a major intellectual contribution of Marx's, but I interpret its importance somewhat differently than Quiggin, as explained below. As to the second component, it seems to me that Quiggin is making the same error here that he does in the discussion of class: he insists that Marxism must be closely tied to a doctrine of historical inevitability. Now, there is no doubt that Marx did at times speak in these terms, sometimes for rhetorical effect. And some of the Marxists who followed him (like Kautsky) went much farther in this direction than the founder himself did. But this is not all Marxism is. It is much more helpful to think of it as a systemic, structural account of capitalism, and a way of thinking of the various *possibilities* for moving beyond capitalism. Speaking of crises "bringing about the revolutionary overthrow of the system", as Quiggin does, is at best vacuous and at worst counter-productive. At one level, clearly capitalism cannot last forever, and so sooner or later a crisis will end it. But there is always the choice between "socialism or barbarism", as Rosa Luxemburg put it. And if Marxist-influenced political movements just wait around for the crisis rather than thinking about ways to *take advantage* of the crises that inevitably arise, then they will fall into just the kind of passivity and defeatism that Quiggin warns against in his post on class.

This last idea, that anti-capitalist movements must take advantage of capitalist crisis, is in my view the most productive use to which Marxist crisis theory can be put. In a way, this makes my critique of Quiggin's crisis post the inverse of my critique of the class post. Above, I argued that what was especially important in a specifically Marxist class theory was the more "apolitical" structural element, which identifies wage labor as both a defining category of capitalist society and the source of a morally odious form of domination. What has been rendered superfluous is the political argument about the importance of the fraction of the working class working as a factory proletariat. With regard to crisis, my intuition is rather the opposite: I place less emphasis on the structural place of crisis within capitalist development, and instead I emphasize the *political* meaning of crisis and its importance in thinking about the transition *out* of capitalism.

The way to think about crises in capitalism is not in terms of historical inevitability. On the contrary, crises are the moments when the system is at its least deterministic and most full of alternative possibilities. The last major crises prior to the present one, in the great Depression and the 1970's, were also the last times when the continued survival of capitalism really appeared in question. Of course, capitalism prevailed and instituted a new regime of accumulation, but this does not mean this was the only possible outcome; history is in some measure stochastic, and there is no reason to be certain who would prevail if we could "run the tape again". Rather than thinking of post-capitalism as a single *telos* that we will arrive at when the conditions within capitalism are "ripe", we should think of the repeated crises of capitalism as producing "branching-off points" in historical time: each crisis *could* have been the jumping-off point for a successor to capitalism (and those hypothetical successors would each have been different and historically specific), or for a new and revivified capitalism. As things actually turned out, of course, capitalism won out each time. But that's all the more reason to think about how things might go differently next time.

Today, of course, there is precious little evidence of anyone using the global crisis to challenge the capitalist system; on the contrary, the elite has further entrenched its rule. This has lead some on the Left, like Doug Henwood and Duncan Foley, to forcefully argue against the idea that crisis is ever "good" for the Left. I agree with them in the narrow sense that it is counter-productive to just sit around and passively wait for a crisis to come along and abolish capitalism, and yet I also think their line of critique misses a larger point about the dialectic of reformist struggles and crisis in capitalism. It's true, as they argue, that incremental victories for the working class--higher wages, an expanded welfare state, and so on--are more likely to be won in stable, healthy economic times rather than in a crisis. But these very reforms tend to reduce the profit rate, erode labor discipline, and generally tip the balance of power away from capital and toward labor. For the ruling class, this is [intolerable on both a political and an economic level](http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/kalecki220510.html), and hence the progress of reform itself tends toward crisis--a crisis which must either discipline labor or replace capitalism. The crisis of the 1970's was a crisis not just of capital, but of the whole Keynesian-New Deal-Fordist class compromise of the postwar years.

If achieving pro-worker reforms tends to produce capitalist crisis, then clearly the left--even, or especially, the reformist Left--needs to have a strategy for directly addressing the crisis, one that goes beyond just preserving an untenable status quo. This, I believe, was one of the fundamental shortcomings of the late 20th century socialist movement. On the reformist, social democratic side, you had parties that understood how to make incremental, day-to-day progress, but were flabbergasted in the face of a crisis, though there were a few intriguing stabs at a transformative strategy such as the [Meidner plan]( http://www.counterpunch.org/blackburn12222005.html). On the revolutionary Communist side, you had parties that ignored such incremental work entirely in order to wait around for the big crisis. Neither perspective is adequate, and what is needed instead is a dialectical synthesis of reform and revolution.

### Capital

Quiggin's [final post](http://crookedtimber.org/2011/07/01/marxism-without-revolution-capital/) is about capital, which I view as really the central category of Marx's mature thought. (The long version of why I think this is more or less Moishe Postone's *Time, Labor and Social Domination*.) Quiggin begins with some stuff about the labor theory of value, but debates about that tend to devolve quickly into uninteresting scholastic disputes about "transforming" values into prices, which is neither very interesting nor very central to what Marx was trying to do. He quickly moves on, however, to something much more important:

> Most importantly, capital is not just an aggregate of machines, buildings, trading stock and so on. It is a social relation, and gives rise to a kind of society quite different from previous societies where power over land was the core relation.

This notion of capital as a social relation structuring society is absolutely central to my definition of Marxism, and it relates back to my earlier critique of Quiggin's post on class. What defines capitalism is not a relationship between people, such as capitalists and workers. Political struggles may manifest themselves as contests between groups of people, but the identity of the specific people is not what is fundamentally at stake. This is unlike a pre-capitalist society defined by relations between lords and peasants, say.

Capitalism is constituted by a relation between two *categories*, capital and wage labor. Each of these categories refers to a particular pattern of actions that is detached from the needs or desires of individual people. The imperative of capital is to turn money into an ever-greater quantity of money irrespective of the particular economic activity by which this is accomplished. The imperative of wage labor is to perform work that one has no inherent interest in so as to acquire the money needed for survival. These categories can overlap and interpenetrate even within the same individual (I am a worker, and I also invest in the stock market). Indeed, as I argued in an [earlier post](www.peterfrase.com/2011/03/capitalism-without-capitalists/) on "capitalism without capitalists", it is possible to conceive of a society that is structured by the opposition between labor and capital, but in which no human beings occupy the role of "capitalist".

At the end of the last post, Quiggin describes the politics of his own non-Marxist social democracy:

> Capitalism is more dynamic than any previous society, but also, in its pure form at least, more unstable, and at least as unequal. These features have been amplified, in ways we have yet to fully comprehend, by the explosive financialisation of the last three decades or so. . . . The problem for social democrats is to keep the dynamism and innovation while delivering more stable and sustainable, and less unjust outcomes.

I agree with the diagnosis of capitalism, but I define the political problem differently. It may be possible to deliver "stable and sustainable" capitalism for a while, but ultimately such a project is both self-contradictory and morally inadequate. Moreover, I suspect that maintaining "dynamism and innovation" in the present era of immaterial production depends on getting *beyond* capitalism rather than depending on it; the alternative is the stagnant artificial scarcity of [anti-Star Trek](http://www.peterfrase.com/2010/12/anti-star-trek-a-theory-of-posterity/). I would say that the problem for Marxist social democrats is to figure out how to build political movements that can win concrete material rewards for people through piecemeal reform, while also creating the conditions for moving society away from the dependence on wage labor and towards other kinds of voluntary forms of productive activity. But I will wait for another post to say more about what I mean by that.

Slouching towards rentier capitalism

July 7th, 2011  |  Published in Political Economy, Politics, Socialism

I feel like I've written a million almost-finished blog posts in the past month without coming up with anything I wanted to put up. But now I'm inspired, because something very interesting is going on in the progressive policy-wonk blogosphere right now. A whole bunch of different writers suddenly seem to be converging on an idea that I've also been playing with for a while: capitalism has gone through, or is going through, the transition to an economy in which rents rather than profits are the dominant form of value extraction.

This started when Robert Kuttner [touched off a conversation](http://www.creditslips.org/files/kuttner-on-past-future-bkcy.pdf) about the role of the rentier class in American politics. Kuttner frames our politics as a contest between the claims of the past and the claims of the future: the former are bonds, loans, and the like, while the latter are potentially productive investments. It's a framing that evokes an old tradition of differentiating productive and unproductive labor, but fingering the financial elite as rentiers is particularly suited to our moment. This idea then got picked up and elaborated in a whole bunch of different places ([Konczal](http://rortybomb.wordpress.com/2011/06/06/robert-kuttner-on-the-aftermath-of-debt-bubbles-and-restructuring-debts/) , [Krugman](http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/06/the-rentier-regime/) , [Horning](http://www.popmatters.com/pm/post/142726-)).

Konczal, in particular, has been great on this. Prior to Kuttner's essay, he had already been writing about the increasing [dominance of the financial sector](http://rortybomb.wordpress.com/2011/03/07/towards-a-theory-of-corporate-and-financial-sector-solidarity/) in the economy. But what really blew my mind was the post he [put up today](http://rortybomb.wordpress.com/2011/07/07/rents-versus-profits-in-the-financial-reform-battle-and-post-industrial-economy/). He goes much farther than any of the other comments by noting that what we really need is to "get a generalizable theoretical framework for conflicts between profits and rents in the post-industrial world." And in search of such a framework, he digs up a [Michael Hardt essay](http://seminaire.samizdat.net/IMG/pdf/Microsoft_Word_-_Michael_Hardt.pdf) that poses the question in explicitly Marxist terms.

Hardt, following Marx, portrays the transition between different economic eras in terms of the dominant form of property in each. Under feudalism and early capitalism, the dominant form is "immobile" property, chiefly land. Under mature industrial capitalism, it is "mobile" property, chiefly the outputs of industrial production. But today, mobile property is becoming subordinate to "immaterial property": copyrights, patents, affect, care, financial claims, and so on. The interesting twist is that it is only under the regime of mobile property that profit becomes the dominant form of value extraction. In both the regime of immobile property and the regime of immaterial property, the dominant form of value extraction is through rent. The key difference between rents and profits is that, according to Hardt:

> In the collection of rent, the capitalist is deemed to be relatively external to the process of the production of value, merely extracting value produced by other means. The generation of profit, in contrast, requires the engagement of the capitalist in the production process, imposing forms of cooperation, disciplinary regimes, etc.

This, I think, gets at the heart of what is going on in contemporary political economy. And it's mildly shocking to me to see somebody like Mike Konczal endorsing it, because this dude is no academic Marxist. He's a former financial engineer who now works at the [Roosevelt Institute](http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/), which is just the sort of mainstream New Deal liberal outfit that it sounds like.

I do think Konczal gets it a bit wrong in one spot, though. Commenting on the Hardt essay, he says:

> Much of the modernization that Marx triumphed was a victory of profit-makers over rent-holders. What Hardt argues is that, as the economy becomes more and more about information, the crucial ends of capital holders is to take things that could belong to the commons and instead appropriate them as property rights and sell them off. The implies a prioritization of rent-holders over profit-makers in terms of power over the economy (also implying a regression back from the future that Marx thought would come after profit-makers – take that Hegelian Marxism!).

Take that, indeed! I think this line of argument is actually a lot more Hegelian than than Konczal gives it credit for. It's true that the return of the rentier looks, superficially, like a regression back to pre-capitalist social relations. And it may bring with it some seemingly atavistic political movements: I'm thinking in particular of movements for debt forgiveness, a political demand that dates back to [ancient times](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jubilee_(Christianity)). But while the form of value extraction as rent looks the same, the *content of the value-creating activity*--and the form of social life that this activity produces--is completely different.

Above, I noted that you can describe economic systems in terms of their dominant property form. But another way to look at it is in terms of the identity of their exploited class. Under a primarily agrarian system based on control of land, it's peasants; under industrial capitalism, factory workers. One big difference between the exploited classes under these two systems is that under the former, peasants are fragmented and isolated from each other, while under the latter the proletariat is brought together in factories and cities and hence becomes a unified and self-aware *class*. Marx famously (or infamously) referred to the "idiocy of rural life", by which he meant that peasants were "idiots" in the etymological [Greek sense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idiot_(Athenian_democracy)): people concerned exclusively with individual and private rather than public affairs. From the [*18th Brumaire*](http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch07.htm):

> The small-holding peasants form an enormous mass whose members live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with each other. **Their mode of production isolates them from one another** instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is furthered by France’s poor means of communication and the poverty of the peasants. Their field of production, the small holding, permits no division of labor in its cultivation, no application of science, and therefore **no multifariousness of development, no diversity of talent, no wealth of social relationships**. Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient, directly produces most of its consumer needs, and thus acquires its means of life more through an exchange with nature than in intercourse with society. **A small holding, the peasant and his family; beside it another small holding, another peasant and another family. A few score of these constitute a village, and a few score villages constitute a department. Thus the great mass of the French nation is formed by the simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes**. Insofar as millions of families live under conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests, and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests forms no community, no national bond, and no political organization among them, they do not constitute a class. They are therefore incapable of asserting their class interest in their own name, whether through a parliament or a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented.

Factory work has a completely different character than this, which is why Marx thought the proletariat was capable of becoming a "class for itself" that could lead the way in overturning capitalism, whereas the peasantry was politically inert.

Above, I noted that peasants and factory workers are the key exploited classes for agrarian and industrial capitalism respectively. What about rentier capitalism? Arguably--and definitely this is Hardt's argument--it's those who provide "immaterial labor". Some of these people are isolated from each other like peasants--women providing care in the home, for example. But a lot of them are engaged in producing what Hardt refers to as "the common": "the results of human labor and creativity, such as ideas, language, affects, and so forth". For instance, one of the big new facts about today's economy is that you have lots of people connecting, collaborating, creating and sharing things over the Internet, creating value that is then extracted by the big network-controlling rentiers like Google and Facebook. That's why Konczal is wrong, and rentier capitalism isn't a regression to an earlier mode of production but rather, as Hardt says in explicitly Hegelian jargon, the "negation of negation": first capitalism negates the individual property of the small proprieter, and then it negates its own form of property as it comes to depend increasingly on the common.

Now, it's certainly possible to argue that these kinds of mass sociality and creativity aren't promising for building political consciousness, and that they just encourage narcisissm, consumerism, and self-commodification. That's what I generally take [Rob Horning](http://www.popmatters.com/pm/blogs/marginal-utility/) to argue, for example, and he's a thoughtful guy whose arguments need to be reckoned with. But while the comment sections on major websites might suggest that the class of immaterial laborers are "idiots" in the contemporary sense, they are in a quite different situation from the rural idiocy Marx described. The "multifariousness of development, diversity of talent, wealth of social relationships" that Marx thought was missing from the peasantry is precisely what contemporary forms of immaterial labor tend to foster. Hence I tend to be cautiously optimistic about their political potential. That, I think is the rational kernel of the talk of "multitude" by Hardt, Negri, et al, even though I tend to find their arguments kind of blustery and overly speculative. (I have some more things to say about creating a new collective agent of anti-capitalist struggle, but those will appear in my essay in the forthcoming issue of [*Jacobin*](http://jacobinmag.com/).)

But it's certainly not inevitable that those who build the common will become a class for themselves. And if they don't, then we instead get a full-fledged rentier capitalism, in which the exploited class is held in new kinds of domination by the rentier class. That's what I was thinking about when I wrote about [Anti-Star Trek](http://www.peterfrase.com/2010/12/anti-star-trek-a-theory-of-posterity/) and [Idiocracy's theory of the future](http://www.peterfrase.com/2011/01/idiocracys-theory-of-the-future/). Which brings me back to why I was so excited about the whole rentier debate in the blogosphere. If so many people are coming around to these ideas from wildly different directions--Kuttner's old fashioned liberalism, Krugman's neoclassical economics, Hardt's post-modern Marxism, and my own weird mix of social democratic and communist impulses--then I start to think that we're hitting on something real and profound about how the current political economy is working.

Manufacturing Output Around the World

April 11th, 2011  |  Published in Political Economy, Statistical Graphics, Work

I went into excruciating detail about manufacturing output statistics in my last post, mainly so that I could post some more analysis using various international sources. One question that often comes up about American manufacturing, after all, is whether our pattern of deindustrialization is unusual compared to other countries. To get some idea, we can use the statistics on employment and output compiled by the OECD. These numbers are, as best I can tell, roughly comparable to the Federal Reserve "output" numbers I used in my initial post on U.S. manufacturing.

For most countries, the OECD data only goes back a few years. So for some of the most interesting cases--namely, recently industrializing poor countries--we don't have good historical data. However, we can at least compare the U.S. to other rich countries. Here's manufacturing employment and output for the U.S., Sweden, and Japan, going back to 1970:

Here, we see that "deindustrialization" in the sense of declining manufacturing employment is not just a U.S. phenomenon. Likewise, manufacturing output has grown dramatically in all three countries. Indeed, output growth has been faster in the U.S.

This is particularly amusing with respect to Japan. Back in the 1980's, of course, Japan played the role of bête noir in American popular discourse that China plays today: the scary Asian menace that was going to out-compete the U.S. economy and ensure our economic doom. And indeed, output and employment in manufacturing both grew faster in Japan than in the U.S. in the 1980's. But since then, Japan has followed the same pattern of employment decline as the United States, while its output has remained stagnant. This is worth keeping in mind when considering the likely future of manufacturing in today's low-wage countries.

But what if we expand our view to include some more recently industrialized countries? Given the available data, we are unfortunately limited to just the most recent business cycle. Still, there are some interesting patterns:

Now some different patterns emerge. The U.S., Germany and especially Korea show the pattern of divergence between employment and output. In South Africa and Turkey, on the other hand, the two are more closely linked. Turkey, in fact, shows an actual increase in the number of manufacturing employees, unlike any of these other countries. This is likely due to a combination of low Turkish wages and proximity to EU markets--along with the anticipation of possible future Turkish membership in the EU. There are those who would like to "bring back" manufacturing jobs from offshore locations like Turkey. But it's not clear how many jobs this would actually create--Turkish manufacturing is a big employer precisely because it isn't all that productive. Protectionist policies--or increases in wages in the low-wage producers--would probably create some jobs in the rich countries, but they would also probably lead to increased use of labor-saving technology.

Of course, we still haven't dealt with the panda bear in the middle of the room: China. But I'm going to wait and put that one in its own post.